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One of the biggest challenges facing researchers trying to empirically test structural or institutional anomie theories is the operationalization of the key 
concept of anomie. This challenge is heightened by the data constraints involved in cross-national research. As a result, researchers have been forced to 
rely on surrogate or proxy measures of anomie and indirect tests of the theories. The purpose of this study is to examine an innovative and more theoreti-
cally sound measure of anomie and to test its ability to make cross-national predictions of serious crime. Our results are supportive of the efficacy of this 
construct to explain cross-national variations in crime rates. Nations with the highest rates of structural anomie also have the highest predicted rates of 
homicide.
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In 1994, Messner and Rosenfeld introduced the theory of 
institutional anomie (IAT). This theory expanded  Merton’s 
original theory on social structure and anomie (1938). Merton 
developed his theory to explain disproportionate crimes rates 
in the United States. He examined the impact of cultural 
goals, the proscribed means of achieving those goals and the 
incongruity between these two things in the United States. 
Crime rates were predicted to be highest in those societies in 
which the culture emphasized monetary attainment to the 
detriment of the legitimate means for attaining it. 
Messner and Rosenfeld expanded on this notion by em-
phasizing the interrelationships among the various social 
institutions in society. They posited that an overemphasis 
on economic goals, coupled with a devaluation of society’s 
non-economic institutions would result in high crime rates. 
Since its initial introduction, numerous researchers have 
attempted to test various aspects of this theory (Chamlin 
and Cochran 1995; Messner and Rosenfeld 1997; Hannon 
and DeFronzo 1998; Piquero and Piquero 1998; Savolainen 
2000; Batton and Jensen 2002; Stucky 2003; Maume and 
Lee 2003; Schoepfer and Piquero 2006). Because of difficul-
ties operationalizing the key concepts of the theory as well 
as numerous data limitations, these empirical examinations 
have only indirectly tested the theory. One of the important 
findings to emerge from these tests is that the key tenets of 
this theory are sensitive to the operationalizations utilized. 
The current study advances this area of inquiry in a number 
of important ways. Firstly, this study utilizes cross-national 
data to examine violent offenses. More importantly, this 
study offers a unique and more theoretically specified 
operationalization of the key tenet of institutional anomie 
theory (IAT), while controlling for the strength of impor-
tant non-economic institutions. 
1. Institutional Anomie
IAT suggests that the high crime rates present in the 
United States are the result of an overemphasis on mate-
rial and monetary attainment, the American Dream. The 
American Dream embodies the fundamental values of 
individualism, universalism, achievement and materialism 
(Messner and Rosenfeld 2006, 129). Messner and Rosenfeld 
suggest that the emphasis on the American Dream and the 
idea that this goal of economic achievement is possible by 
everyone in a system is underscored by open, individual 
competition. 
Further, Messner and Rosenfeld (1994) examined the influ-
ence of various social institutions in promoting crime. 
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As they point out, social institutions help individuals to 
achieve these goals by socializing individuals to society’s 
norms, helping them organize resources, and helping them 
cope. They focus on four such institutions: the economy, the 
family, the polity, and education. 
The main tenet of their arguments is that crime is prevalent 
in situations where the economy is emphasized to the detri-
ment of these other social institutios. The economy is the 
social institutions primarily responsible for promoting the 
fundamental values of the American Dream. Further, they 
note that a capitalistic economy is important as it allows for 
“private ownership and control of property and free market 
mechanisms for the production and distribution of goods 
and services” (1994, 76). When the economy is accentuated 
and the alternate non-economic institutions weakened, a 
situation where economic values dominate is present. When 
this happens the non-economic institutions must make 
accommodations that help further the dominance of the 
economy. For example, family time is sacrificed for work 
time. Further, economic goals and values become impor-
tant in the context of non-economic institutions. Eventual-
ly, these non-economic institutions start to operate in man-
ners that reinforce these economic goals. It is this situation 
that Messner and Rosenfeld believe is most criminogenic. 
The cultural imbalance identified above helps to promote 
anomie which in turn promotes crime. Additionally, these 
conditions also render the social control functions of the 
non-economic institutions ineffective. 
The basic principles of Messner and Rosenfeld’s theory have 
been tested several times. As noted earlier, two of the great-
est challenges to empirically testing this theory are the dif-
ficulty operationalizing its key concepts and the difficulties 
inherent in collecting the requisite cross-national data. As a 
result, most previous tests of this theory have utilized inap-
propriate units of analysis (i.e., anything less than cross-
national) and/or have been partial or indirect. Clearly the 
most important concept proposed both by Merton and by 
Messner and Rosenfeld is the idea of anomie. Since it is not 
practical to measure anomie directly at the aggregate level, 
it is necessary to identify situations where anomic pressures 
would be expected to be present. Therefore, researchers rely 
on measures such as economic strength and relative and 
absolute deprivation. 
Chamlin and Cochran (1995) provided one of the first 
tests of the theory. They examined poverty to measure the 
impact of economic conditions and determine whether the 
effects of these conditions on rates of crime varied by the 
strength of non-economic institutions. They found that the 
influence of poverty on property crimes was dependent on 
the strength of other non-economic institutions such as 
family, polity, and religion. 
Messner and Rosenfeld took a slightly different approach 
and examined the effects of decommodification of labor 
on cross-national homicide rates. Decommodification 
should operate to moderate the influence of the economy 
on homicide rates. They found support for this proposition 
among a sample of forty-five nations. Similarly Hannon and 
De Fronzo (1998) examined the influence of social welfare 
assistance in moderating the effects of economic depriva-
tion on crime rates. They likewise found that higher levels 
of welfare assistance operated to moderate and reduce the 
influence of economic disadvantage on crime rates. 
Savolainen (2002) examined economic inequality to predict 
cross-national homicide rates while controlling for the 
strength of both the economy and other social institutions. 
His findings provided support for the idea that economic 
inequality was a predictor of homicide in situations with 
weak welfare support. 
Piquero and Piquero (1998) focused on exploring various 
operationalizations of the key concepts in the theory to 
predict both property and violent crime rates. They found 
that the influence of the strength of the economy on crime 
was influenced by the effect of various social institutions. 
More importantly, they found the analysis to be sensitive to 
various operationalizations of the key independent vari-
ables, suggesting that findings may not be uniform and are 
influence by the measurements utilized. 
All in all, various empirical tests of IAT have found sup-
port for several aspects of the theory. However, the majority 
of these examinations have approached the study of this 
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theory in similar fashions. First, the majority of these stud-
ies have utilized data from only the United States (Chamlin 
and Cochran 1995; Hannon and DeFronzo 1998; Piquero 
and Piquero 1998; Stuckey 2003; Schoepfer and Piquero 
2006). While these tests have provided important insights 
into the theory, they have not allowed the theory to be 
tested as it was originally proposed. Messner and Rosen-
feld, like Merton, point out that the theories were designed 
to explain high crime rates in the United States relative to 
other countries. Therefore, this proposition can only be 
fully tested by utilizing a cross-national sample. 
In addition, one of the greatest challenges facing researchers 
who wish to empirically test Mertonian structural anomie 
theory or Messner and Rosenfeld’s institutional anomie 
theory is the ability to directly measure anomie at the ag-
gregate level. Previous researchers have been forced to rely 
on proxy or surrogate measures, typically relying on single 
indicators of economic strength (gross domestic product) 
or deprivation/economic inequality (Gini coefficient) (e.g., 
Messner 1982; Messner and Tardiff 1986; Chamlin and 
Cochran 1995; Piquero and Piquero 1998; Savolainen 2000; 
Messner, Raffalovich, and Schrock 2002; Maume and Lee 
2003). 
Messner and Rosenfeld conceptualized anomie as a multi-
dimensional concept. They indicate that one would expect 
anomie to be present in societies that emphasize the Ameri-
can Dream while simultaneously blocking a portion of their 
populace from the legitimate, societally prescribed means 
for achieving those goals. Further, they define the American 
Dream as “a commitment to the goal of material success, 
to be pursued by everyone in society, under conditions of 
open, individual competition” (2007, 68). Meritocracy is 
expected to increase anomie specifically in situations where 
an egalitarian ideology does not differentiate between vari-
ous strata with differential access to success (Passas 1997). 
Theoretically, one would also expect anomie to be highest in 
situations where non-economic institutions have been co-
opted through the penetration and accommodation of eco-
nomic values and consequently have lost their effectiveness 
as control institutions. In fact, Merton originally hypoth-
esized that it was the combination of cultural universalism, 
cultural imbalance, and a stratified social structure that 
leads to anomie. Messner and Rosenfeld (2007) reiterate that 
anomie is produced by cultural pressures to achieve mate-
rial wealth coupled with a strong economy that reinforces 
this goal. Therefore, one would expect anomie to be present 
in situations of open competition, where monetary achieve-
ment and individual economic success are emphasized and 
portions of the population are impeded from achieving suc-
cess. All three conditions should be simultaneously present 
to produce high levels of anomie. Previous research testing 
this theory has relied on either single indicators of anomie 
or when examining multiple indicators has examined only 
the direct effects of these measures. 
The present study advances the current debate by utilizing a 
cross-national sample to test the relative effects of an alter-
native and more theoretically specified operationalization 
of anomie on serious violent offenses. If these indicators 
must all be present simultaneously, then the appropriate 
specification of this measure would be a multiplicative term 
measuring the effect of economic strength with an empha-
sis on open competition in a situation where segments of 
the population are simultaneously blocked from achieving 
success. We will examine the influence of this new measure 
on cross-national homicide rates while simultaneously con-
trolling for the strength of non-economic institutions. 
2. Data and Measures
As noted above, IAT attempts to explain macro-level crime 
rates. The data for this study were collected for forty-nine 
nations from a variety of sources including the Internation-
al Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), the World 
Health Organization, the United Nations, the World Bank, 
and other international sources identified in Appendix A; 
1 The data for this study was utilized in a previous 
study and therefore the methods section is substan-
tially similar in nature (see Bjerregaard and Cochran 
2008). The forty-nine nations examined are: Alba-
nia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Bul-
garia, Canada, Columbia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Estonia, 
Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hunga-
ry, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, South Korea, Kyrgyz-
stan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Maldives, Mol-
dova, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, 
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Singapore, Slovenia, 
South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Trinidad, 
Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, and United States.
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the data for the independent variables were taken from 1997 
where possible and 1996 if 1997 data were not available.1 Ap-
pendix B shows the means, standard deviations, and ranges 
for the measures utilized in the analysis. 
Crime rates. Messner and Rosenfeld (1994) propose that 
their theory also explains cross-national differences in the 
rate of serious crimes; therefore, cross-national homicide 
rates are utilized as our measure of crime. This measure 
offers the additional advantage of being considered the most 
reliable and accurate estimate of crime available for cross-
national comparisons. Homicide rate data were derived 
from both the World Health Organization (1997–99) and 
the International Crime Statistics published by INTERPOL 
(1997). The primary source of data is the World Health 
Organization (WHO). If data were missing from this 
source, INTERPOL data were utilized. While WHO data 
are considered by some to be the most reliable estimates of 
international crime rates (Avison and Loring 1986; Savol-
ainen 2000; Messner, Raffalovich, and Schrock 2002; cf. 
Krahn, Hartnagel, and Gartrell 1986; Nalla and Newman 
1994; Chamlin and Cochran 2007), the WHO and INTER-
POL measures correlate very highly for the sub-sample of 
nations for which complete data are available. 
To control for yearly fluctuations, multi-year averages were 
computed. A logged transformation of this measure was 
utilized as it was highly positively skewed. Initial analyses 
also indicated potential problems with heteroscadasticity 
which were greatly reduced once the measures were logged.
Numerous concerns regarding the use of official statistics 
to measure cross-national crime have been raised (e.g., 
Newman 1999). One of the primary issues is the possibil-
ity of systematic bias in the reporting practices of various 
nations.2 Kick and LaFree (1985, 42), however, conclude 
that offenses such as homicide, which has ancient origins, 
exhibit a fairly high degree of definitional consistency and 
are more comparable. Likewise, Krohn and Wellford (1977) 
and Krohn (1978) also suggest that problems of systematic 
bias may not be particularly serious. This was also con-
cluded by Bennett and Lynch (1990) who examined the 
reliability of four cross-national crime data sets, including 
Archer and Gartner’s CCDF, INTERPOL, UN, and WHO 
data.3 They concluded that for analytical purposes all four 
data sets afforded substantively similar results (1990, 176). 
They also concluded that analytic studies were “more robust 
than descriptive studies with respect to error” and that such 
error did not necessarily affect the substantive findings 
unless correlated with the independent variables (1990, 157). 
They also suggest that aggregating these indicators helps to 
mitigate some of these issues. 
Anomie. Messner and Rosenfeld (2001, 68) stress that the 
core values expressed in the American Dream are support-
ed by the economy and that the most important charac-
teristic of the American economy is its capitalistic nature 
which is defined by “both private ownership and control of 
property and free-market mechanisms for the production 
and distribution of goods and services.” However, they also 
stress that a free-market economy, if unregulated by other 
non-economic social institutions, will adversely impact 
crime rates. When the economy is unchecked by non-eco-
nomic social institutions, the principles of the free-market 
economy dominate and infiltrate the functions of these 
other institutions. The degree to which economic condi-
tions influence non-economic institutions is associated with 
both the amount of control or political restraint the state 
exerts over the economy and the extent to which it attempts 
to mediate the effects of these economic conditions (Batton 
and Jensen 2002, 7). In fact, anomie should be greatest in 
situations where the American Dream is emphasized under 
conditions of open, individual competition (Messner and 
Rosenfeld 1994). These conditions should have more of an 
impact when state regulation and control are reduced. This 
suggests that the impact of the economy on crime at a cross-
2 It should be noted that the same concerns 
have been raised concerning crime esti-
mates across the United States  (Wiersema, 
Loftin, and McDowall 2000).
3 In fact, Bennett and Lynch (1990, 176–77) suggest 
that the selection of a data set should be based 
on coverage or logistical considerations. In our 
data, the homicide rates reported by INTER-
POL and the WHO were found to correlate at 
.80 lending credence to the idea that they are 
substantially measuring the same phenomenon.
187IJCV : Vol. 2 (2) 2008, pp. 182 – 193Beth Bjerregaard, and John K. Cochran: Want Amid Plenty: Developing and Testing a Cross-National Measure of Anomie
national level of analysis involves at least three elements: (1) 
the degree of economic freedom/regulation within a nation, 
(2) the strength of the economy to sustain opportunities 
for the accrual of wealth, and (3) the nature of economic 
conditions (i.e., the extent to which opportunities for wealth 
accrual are open for all members of society).
 The prominence of a free-market economy, unrestrained 
and unregulated by social or political constraints is mea-
sured first by an index of economic freedom developed by 
the Heritage Foundation (O’Driscoll, Holmes, and O’Grady 
2003). Economic freedom is defined as “the absence of 
government coercion or constraint on the production, dis-
tribution, or consumption of goods and services beyond the 
extent necessary for citizens to protect and maintain liberty 
itself” (Beach and O’Driscoll 2003, 2). Each country is 
rated by examining fifty economic variables classified into 
ten broad categories including: trade policy, fiscal burden 
of government, government intervention in the economy, 
monetary policy, capital flows and foreign investment, 
banking and finance, wages and prices, property rights, 
regulation, and black market activity (Beach and O’Driscoll 
2003, 2). High scores on this variable are indicative of 
institutional policies that are most conducive to economic 
freedom.4
In a free market economy one would expect obstacles to 
economic success to have a direct impact on crime rates. In 
the present study, economic obstacles are operationalized 
by a measure of relative deprivation or economic inequal-
ity. Nearly every test of IAT has also employed a measure of 
economic inequality as an indicator of deprivation related 
to impediments to economic attainment: Chamlin and 
Cochran (1995) and Piquero and Piquero (1998) both used a 
measure of the percent of families living in poverty; Mess-
ner and Rosenfeld (1997), Savolainen (2000), and Maume 
and Lee (2003) each used the Gini coefficient as their mea-
sure of economic inequality; Messner and Rosenfeld (1997) 
and Savolainen (2000) also utilized an index of economic 
discrimination; Schoepfer and Piquero (2006) employed 
percent unemployed as their measure of the strength of the 
economy; while Messner and Rosenfeld (1997), Hannon and 
DeFronzo (1998), and Stucky (2003) each employed an index 
economic deprivation consisting of several of the indicators 
employed by the other studies. The present study employs 
the Gini coefficient of household income to measure eco-
nomic inequality or relative deprivation. This coefficient 
ranges in value from 0 to 100 with a score of 0 representing 
perfect income equality and a score of 100 representing a 
perfectly unequal distribution of income.5
Finally, one would expect anomie to be present in situa-
tions where the strength of the economy was high In other 
words, a strong economy will operate to enhance the impact 
of income inequality on homicide rates. It should be noted 
that the direct impact of economic strength or GDP may in 
fact be negative. Messner and Rosenfeld (2007, 19) note that 
GDP, as a measure of economic development, may reduce 
rates of violent crimes in modern nations characterized by 
urbanization and industrialization. The “modernization 
thesis” hypothesizes that development is negatively related 
to violent crime (Shelley 1981). Similar arguments have been 
made that increased development reduces the opportuni-
ties for interpersonal contacts that can enhance homicide 
rates (LaFree and Kick 1986; Messner and Rosenfeld 1997). 
The dominance or strength of the economy is measured by 
the Gross Domestic Product in U.S. dollars. Because of the 
highly skewed nature of this variable the log value of the 
gross domestic product is utilized in the analysis. 
Our current measure of anomie is a multiplicative func-
tion of each of the three measures above. One would expect 
conditions of anomie to be highest in situations where one 
has a strong economy operating on free market principles 
coupled with high levels of economic inequality or re-
stricted opportunities for some segments of society (i.e., 
want amid plenty). To accommodate the inclusion of the 
4 The variable was originally measured on a 
scale from 1 to 5 with high scores representing 
policies that were least conducive to economic 
freedom. In the current analyses the variable was 
rescaled from 0 to 4 and then reversed coded 
so that higher scores represented greater eco-
nomic freedom. For further information see http://
www.heritage.org/research/features/index.
5 For countries with missing data on the 
Gini coefficient, aggregated mean substitu-
tion was utilized (by region and the United 
Nations human development code).
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necessary two-way and three-way cross-product interaction 
terms comprised by each of these three correlated measures, 
we have mean-centered each. 
Economic growth. Economic growth can serve as an indica-
tor of the advancement of a country’s economy. By facili-
tating increased consumption, economic growth has the 
propensity to impact many aspects of citizens’ quality of 
life. Perhaps most relevant to the study of anomie is its pro-
pensity to generate additional “wants” for citizens. Ironical-
ly, although economic growth can reduce absolute poverty, 
it can also increase income inequality, potentially leading to 
lesser abilities of segments of society to achieve prosperity 
in this environment – which should, according to anomie 
theory, facilitate crime. In our study economic growth is 
measured by the annual percentage growth of the gross 
domestic product. To negate potential yearly fluctuations 
in this measure, the annual percentage growth in GDP was 
averaged for the years 1995 – 97. This measure is included to 
control for the potential that a country’s economic growth 
might confound the observed relationship between its eco-
nomic strength and crime rates. In addition, the country’s 
total population is included as a control variable. 
Non-economic institutions.  
(a) The family
Messner and Rosenfeld (1994) stipulate a need to control for 
the strength of non-economic social institutions, specifi-
cally the family, polity, and education. One of the most 
consistently utilized measures of the weakening of the 
family unit is the divorce rate (Chamlin and Cochran 1995; 
Piquero and Piquero 1998; Maume and Lee 2003; Schoe-
pfer and Piquero 2006). While this measure is subject to 
certain qualifications, including differential definitions of 
divorce cross-nationally, it is commonly used in macro-level 
research as an indicator of family disruption (Maume and 
Lee 2003; Gartner 1990).6 High divorce rates, as a measure 
of family disruption – indicating a breakdown of the tradi-
tional nuclear family as well as a measure of the permeation 
of economic norms – is a more complete measure of extent 
to which the family has been devalued as economic values 
have been accommodated.
(b) The polity 
As a social institution, the political system is utilized to 
promote and attain collective goals, unless co-opted by 
the economy (Messner and Rosenfeld 2001, 65). Messner 
and Rosenfeld (2001, 76–97, 104–106) further maintain that 
involvement in the political process can promote a sense of 
community and lead to a reduction in anomie. They also 
point to low voter turnout as an indicator that the polity is 
devalued (2001, 71). Accordingly, the ineffectiveness of the 
polity was measured by the lack of voter turnout at the latest 
election. That is, this measure was created by subtracting 
the percentage of the population that voted at the last elec-
tion from 100.
(c) Education
Messner and Rosenfeld (2001) point to the importance of 
the educational system as a socializing agent. They stress 
that the educational system is also responsible for prepar-
ing youth for their occupational roles (2001: 66). Consistent 
with previous examinations of the theory, the strength of 
the educational system is measured by educational expen-
ditures as a percentage of GDP (Maume and Lee 2003). So 
that all measures of non-economic institutions reflect the 
inability of these institutions to mediate the effects of the 
economy, the weakness of the educational system is mea-
sured by subtracting the educational expenditures from 100 
so that high scores indicate weak educational systems.
3. Findings
Table 1 presents OLS regression models for the effects of our 
three indicators of economic strength, economic growth, 
and the three indicators of the strength of non-economic 
social institutions on cross-national rates of homicide. Our 
findings are somewhat mixed. Firstly, the most parsimoni-
ous model (Model 1: direct effects of economic conditions 
6 To the extent to which various countries 
have different wait periods and/or procedures 
for attaining a divorce, we would expect that 
our measures would be a conservative esti-
mate of family disruption and simply under-
estimate the true impact of this concept.
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without controls) accounted for 52 percent of the variance 
in the cross-national rates of homicide; the inclusion of the 
two-way and three-way cross-product terms among the 
economic indicators (Model 2) raised the variance explained 
to 64 percent and the full model (Model 3), which added 
the control variables, increased the variance explained to 71 
percent. Next, based on the extant research literature which 
has examined the direct effects of economic conditions on 
cross-national rates of crime, we anticipated that the effect 
of economic inequality (i.e., Gini coefficient) on crime 
would be positive and we observe as much. Likewise, with 
regard to the direct effect of the economic freedom index, 
we anticipated a positive effect and that is what we observed, 
though non-significant. Finally, consistent with modern-
ization theory we find the direct effect of gross domestic 
product to be negatively associated with the cross-national 
rate of homicide. This finding is consistent with research 
demonstrating that modernization or economic develop-
ment is associated with a decrease in interpersonal violence 
(Messner and Rosenfeld 1997; Antonaccio and Tittle 2007). 
Table 1: OLS regression – the relative effects of the components 
of institutional anomie on cross-national rates of homicide
Homicide rates
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Gini  .057**  .075**  .061**
GDP  -.644*  -.723**  -.716**
Economic freedom  .360  .298  .507
GDP*Gini  .072**  .064**
Gini*Freedom  .049  .064
GDP*Freedom  -.337  -.222
Gini*GDP*Freedom  .060  .082*
Family  -.003
Polity  .027*
Education  -.168
Economic growth  -.060  .001  .011
Total population 7.18E-009 5.43E-009 6.30E-009
R2  .52**  .64**  .71**
V.I.F.  < 2.95  <3.46  < 3.56
* P < .05
** P < .01
Messner and Rosenfeld, like Merton, have conceptualized 
structural anomie to be present under conditions in which 
(1) the dominant culture prescribes as legitimate the goal 
of economic security (i.e., a cultural emphasis on wealth 
accrual, represented here as the economic freedom index), 
(2) the structural organization of the economy permits the 
acquisition of great wealth (i.e., economic strength rep-
resented here by the gross domestic product), but (3) the 
structural organization of society blocks the access of some 
of its members to the legitimate means to attains this goal 
(i.e., relative deprivation/economic inequality/blocked op-
portunities, represented here by the Gini coefficient). Model 
2 introduces interactive effects among these three measures 
of economic conditions (i.e., two- and three-way cross-
product terms) to test this thesis. This more complex model 
substantially increased the variance explained compared 
to its more parsimonious counterpart. The main effect of 
economic inequality attained statistical significance, as 
did one of its two-way interactive effects (with GDP). High 
levels of economic inequality are associated with high levels 
of homicide, especially in countries with a strong economy. 
The effect of the three-way interaction term is positive as ex-
pected, but it fails to reach a level of statistical significance.
Finally, Model 3 of Table 1 introduces controls for the 
strength of non-social institutions and economic growth to 
the conditioned effects models just discussed. The addi-
tion of these control variables did little to alter the find-
ings for the significant predictors in Model 2. The variance 
explained increased to 71 percent. As before, cross-national 
rates of homicide are positively associated with high levels 
of economic inequality and are reduced by a strong econo-
my, for nations at mean levels on the respective condition-
ing variables. The statistically significant two-way interac-
tion between economic inequality and economic strength 
remains significant. However, in this fully specified model, 
the hypothesized three-way interaction term is also signifi-
cantly positive. This indicates that the effect of economic 
inequality on the rate of homicide is enhanced by a strong 
economy, especially where the culture stresses economic 
freedom and wealth attainment. 
The findings observed for the effects of the strength of non-
economic institutions are somewhat mixed. Only the polity 
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achieves statistical significance. As expected, poor voter 
turnout is positively associated with higher cross-national 
rates of homicide. Economic growth and the country’s 
population size are not significantly associated with the 
cross-national rate of homicide. 
4. Conclusion
Without question one of the most vexing problems fac-
ing researchers trying to test structural or institutional 
anomie theories is the operationalization of anomie. This 
challenge is magnified in the context of comparative 
criminology by the data constraints already present. As a 
result, researchers are forced to rely on indirect tests and 
often weak surrogate or proxy measures of key theoreti-
cal variables. This study offers a unique and, we believe, 
more theoretically sound operationalization of structural/
institutional anomie. We argue that a theoretically sound 
operationalization of anomie should address the joint so-
cietal conditions minimally necessary for structural ano-
mie to be operative and under which economic inequality 
can then lead to increased rates of crime cross-nationally. 
Messner and Rosenfeld, like Merton, have conceptualized 
structural anomie to be present when the dominant cul-
ture prescribes as legitimate the goal of economic success, 
and the strength of the economy permits the acquisition 
of great wealth, but the structural organization of society 
blocks the access of some of its members to the legitimate 
means to attains this goal (to this Messner and Rosenfeld 
add a fourth condition: non-economic social institutions 
are not sufficiently strong to offset these anomic and 
criminogenic conditions). We have argued with regard to 
these three necessary elements of an anomic society that 
an examination of their independent or relative effects, 
which is normative for this area of research, constitutes a 
theoretical misspecification of both Mertonian structural 
anomie and Messner and Rosenfeld’s conceptualization 
of institutional anomie. We believe structural anomie is 
best conceptualized as a multiplicative construct involving 
direct, two-way, and three-way interactions.
We tested the efficacy of such a construct to explain cross-
national variation in the rate of homicide while controlling 
for the strength of several non-economic social institu-
tions. We used the Economic Freedom Index developed by 
Heritage Foundation (O’Driscoll, Holmes, and O’Grady 
2003) as our measure of a cultural emphasis on economic 
accrual, the gross domestic product as our measure of the 
economic strength of a nation-state (with population size 
controlled), and the commonly employed Gini coefficient 
as our measure of blocked opportunities. Our results are 
supportive of the efficacy of this construct to explain cross-
national variation in the rate of homicide. That is, several of 
our multiplicative functions were (as expected) significantly 
associated with cross-national rates of homicide. 
Table 2: Predicted rates of homicide under varying economic conditions
Gini index: GDP: Economic freedom index: Predicted homicide rate:
Average Average Average  3.080
High High High  143.452
High High Low  0.693
High Low High  7.396
High Low Low  5.254
Low High Low  1.578
Low High High  0.087
Low Low High  53.144
Low Low Low  2.869
Note: Predicted rates (log) were computed at “average” (mean), “high” (1.5 standard deviations 
above the mean) and “low” (1.5 standard deviations below the mean) values of the economic 
condition variables and the means of the exogenous control variables. These combinations of 
high and low values of the economic conditions measures constitute hypothetical cases and do 
not represent any real cases in these data.
More importantly, predicted rates of homicide generated 
from the parameter estimates in Model 3 reveal the dramat-
ic effect of structural anomie (see Table 2). Uniquely high 
rates of homicide are predicted for those societies character-
ized by high levels of both economic freedom and economic 
inequality (143.452 compared to the average predicted rate 
of 3.080 and all other predicted rates ranging from a high of 
53.144 to a low of 0.087). Such societies are characterized by 
the joint effects of a powerful cultural force that elevates as-
pirations for economic success and converts these cultural 
aspirations into expectations and high levels of economic 
inequality. In such societal arrangements, where there is 
a culture that fosters economic attainment and a strong 
economy to make manifest these economic goals and values 
but high levels of economic inequality have foreclosed the 
legitimate opportunities for economic attainment (i.e., 
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where there is “want amid plenty”), homicide finds expres-
sion. Such societies are structurally anomic as specified by 
Merton and by Messner and Rosenfeld. 
It is important to note that this research is not immune to 
the criticism leveled at other aggregate tests of structural 
or at institutional anomie theories or at cross-national 
research in criminology. Missing data on key concepts 
necessarily restricted the number of nation-states that 
could be examined. Likewise, the analysis fails to control 
for other measures known to influence homicide rates (e.g., 
absolute deprivation/poverty, urbanism, etc.). This research, 
however, does underscore the importance of refining our 
operationalization of key theoretical constructs. We need 
to continue our focus on developing appropriate measures 
of our theoretical concepts and more directly testing our 
theories to gain a better understanding of the variation in 
crime rates cross-nationally.
192IJCV : Vol. 2 (2) 2008, pp. 182 – 193Beth Bjerregaard, and John K. Cochran: Want Amid Plenty: Developing and Testing a Cross-National Measure of Anomie
References
Agnew, R. 1999. A General Strain Theory of Community Differences in 
Crime Rates. Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency 36:123–55.
Avison, William R., and Pamela L. Loring. 1986. Population Di-
versity and Cross-National Homicide: The Effects of In-
equality and Heterogeneity. Criminology 24:733–49.
Bailey, William C. 1984. Poverty, Inequality and City Homicide Rates: 
Some Not So Unexpected Findings. Criminology 22: 531–50.
Batton, Candice, and Gary Jensen. 2002. Decommodification and Homicide 
Rates in the 20th-Century United States. Homicide Studies 6:6–38.
Beach, William W, and Gerald P. O’Driscoll, Jr. 2003. Explaining the Factors 
of the Index of Economic Freedom. In 2003 Index of Economic Freedom, 
ed. Gerald P. O’Driscoll, Jr., Kim P. Holmes, and Mary Anastasia O’Grady. 
Washington, D.C.: Heritage Foundation and Wall Street Journal.
Bennett, Richard R., and James P. Lynch. 1990. Does a Difference Make a Differ-
ence? Comparing Cross-National Crime Indicators. Criminology 28:153–82.
Bjerregaard, Beth, and John K. Cochran. 2008. A Cross-National Test 
of Institutional Anomie Theory: Do the Strength of Other Social 
Institutions Mediate or Moderate the Effects of the Economy on 
the Rate of Crime? Western Criminology Review 9 (1): 31–48.
Blau, Judith R., and Peter M. Blau. 1982. The Cost of Inequality: Metropolitan 
Structure and Violent Crime. American Sociological Review 47:114–29.
Chamlin, Mitchell B., and John K. Cochran. 1995. Assessing Messner and Rosen-
feld’s Institutional Anomie Ttheory: A Partial Test. Criminology 33: 411–29.
Chamlin, Mitchell B., and John K. Cochran. 2007. An Evalua-
tion of the Assumptions that Underlie Institutional Ano-
mie Theory. Theoretical Criminology 11:39–61.
Gartner, Rosemary. 1990. The Victims of Homicide: A Temporal and Cross-
National Comparison. American Sociological Review 55:92–106.
Grasmick, Harold G., and Robert J. Bursik, Jr. 1990. Conscience, 
Significant Others, and Rational Choice: Extending the De-
terrence Model. Law and Society Review 24:837–61.
Hannon, Lance, and James DeFronzo. 1998. The Truly Disadvantaged, 
Public Assistance, and Crime. Social Problems 45:383–92.
Interpol. 1997. International Crime Statistics. Paris: Interpol.
Kick, Edward L., and Gary d. La Free. 1985. Development and the Social 
Context of Murder and Theft. Comparative Social Research 8:37–58.
Krahn, Harvey, Timothy F. Hartnagel, and John W. Gartrell. 1986. 
Income Inequality and Homicide Rates: Cross-National Data 
and Criminological Theories. Criminology 24: 269–295.
Krohn, Marvin D. 1978. A Durkheimian Analysis of Inter-
national Crime Rates. Social Forces 57:654–70.
Krohn, Marvin D., and Charles Wellford. 1977. A Static and Dynamic 
Analysis of Crime and the Primary Dimensions of Nations. In-
ternational Journal of Criminology and Penology 5:1–16.
LaFree, Gary, and Edward L. Kick. 1986. Cross-national Effects of Devel-
opmental, Distributional, and Demographic Variables on Crime: A 
Review and Analysis. International Annals of Criminology 24:213–35.
Maume, Michael O., and Matthew R. Lee. 2003. Social Institutions and Violence: 
A Sub-National Test of Institutional Anomie Theory. Criminology 41:1137–72.
Merton, Robert K. 1938. Social Structure and Ano-
mie. American Sociological Review 3:672–82.
Messner, Steven F. 1982. Poverty, Inequality and Urban Homicide 
Rates: Some Unexpected Findings. Criminology 20:103–14.
Messner, Steven F., Lawrence E. Raffalovich, and Peter Schrock. 2002. Reas-
sessing the Cross-National Relationship Between Income Inequality and 
Homicide Rates: Implications of Data Quality Control in the Measurement 
of Income Distribution. Journal of Quantitative Criminology 18:377–95.
Messner, Steven F., and Richard Rosenfeld. 1994. Crime and 
the American Dream. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.
Messner, Steven F., and Richard Rosenfeld. 1997. Political Restraint of the 
Market and Levels of Criminal Homicide: A Cross-National Applica-
tion of Institutional Anomie Theory. Social Forces 75:1393–1416.
Messner, Steven F., and Richard Rosenfeld. 2001. Crime and the 
American Dream, 3rd ed. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.
Messner, Steven F., and Richard Rosenfeld. 2006. The Present and Future of 
Institutional-Anomie Theory. In Taking Stock: The Status of Criminologi-
cal Theory, Advances in Criminological Theory, vol. 15, ed. Francis T. Cullen, 
John Paul Wright, and Kristie R. Blevins. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction
Messner, Steven F., and Richard Rosenfeld. 2007. Crime and the 
American Dream, 4th ed. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.
Messner, Steven F., and Kenneth Tardiff. 1986. Economic Inequality and Levels 
of Homicide: an Analysis of Urban Neighborhoods. Criminology 24:297–315.
Nalla, Mahesh, and Graeme Newman. 1994. Crime in the U.S. and the Former 
U.S.S.R.: A Comparison of Crime Trends from the Third U. N. Survey. 
International Journal of Comparative and Applied Criminal Justice 18:85–94.
Newman, Graeme. 1999. Global Report on Crime and Jus-
tice. New York: Oxford University Press.
O’Driscoll, Gerald P., Jr., Kim P Holmes, and Mary Anasta-
sia O’Grady. 2003. Index of Economic Freedom. Washing-
ton, D.C.: Heritage Foundation and Wall Street Journal.
Passas, Nikos. 1997. Anomie, Reference Groups and Relative De-
privation. In The Future of Anomie Theory, ed. Nikos Pas-
sas and Robert Agnew. Boston: Northeastern Press.
Piquero, Alex, and Nicole Leeper Piquero. 1998. On Test-
ing Institutional Anomie Theory with Varying Specifica-
tions. Studies on Crime and Crime Prevention 7:61–84.
Savolainen, Jukka. 2000. Inequality, Welfare State and Homicide: Further 
Support for the Institutional Anomie Theory. Criminology 38:1021–42.
Schoepfer, Andrea, and Nicole Leeper Piquero. 2006. Exploring White-
collar Crime and the American Dream: A Partial Test of Institu-
tional Anomie Theory. Journal of Criminal Justice 34:227–35.
Shelley, Louise I. 1981. Crime and Modernization. Carbon-
dale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press.
Stucky, Thomas D. 2003. Local Politics and Violent Crime 
In U.S. Cities. Criminology 41: 1101–35.
Wiersema, Brian, Colin Loftin, and David McDowall. 2000. A Comparison 
of Supplementary Homicide Reports and National Vital Statistics System 
Homicide Estimates for U.S. Counties. Homicide Studies 4: 317–40.
World Bank. 2001. World Development Indicators 2001. CD-
ROM. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank.
World Health Organization. 2000. World Health Statistics An-
nual, 1997–1999, online edition. New York: WHO.
193IJCV : Vol. 2 (2) 2008, pp. 182 – 193Beth Bjerregaard, and John K. Cochran: Want Amid Plenty: Developing and Testing a Cross-National Measure of Anomie
Appendix A: Measures and Data Sources
Measures Data source
Crime:
Homicide Rates International Crime Statistics (Interpol 1997).
World Health Statistics Annual, 1997-1999,  
online edition (World Health Organization 2000).
Economic conditions:
Economic freedom Heritage Foundation.
GDP, annual % growth, 
and total population
World Development Indicators 2001, CD-ROM 
(World Bank 2001).
Gini coefficient World Inequality Database 
World Institute for Economic Research. 
World Resources Institute Facts and Figures: 
Environmental Data Tables 
World Resources Institute.
Family:
Divorce rates International Marketing Data and Statistics, 2001.
Education:
Public expenditures on 
education as a % of GNP
World Development Indicators 2001, CD-ROM 
(World Bank 2001).
Polity:
Voter Turnout Human Development Report, 2000,  
United Nations.
Appendix B: Description of Study Variables
Minimum Maximum Mean Standard deviation
Logged GDP  9.249656  12.91587449  10.75507191  0.891014423
Income inequality  19.5  59.3  34.02122449  9.286159646
Economic freedom  1.5  4.65  2.758163265  0.676337174
Economic growth  272000  271542464  26263040.45  46203417.01
Total population  0.1  64  26.01979592  20.74040747
Family disruption  5  64  28.51020408  13.67193361
Polity  2.2  9.7  5.42244898  1.6919251
Education  -0.62861  4.801312462  1.188362056  1.320374672
Logged homicide rates  9.249656  12.91587449  10.75507191  0.891014423
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